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Motivation: We compare the contents of 86 Internet black-
lists to provide a view of the whole ecosystem of block-
ing network touch points and blacklists. We aim to for-
malize and evaluate practitioner tacit knowledge of the fa-
tigue of playing “whack-a-mole” against resilient adversary
resources.
Method: Lists are compared to lists of the same data type
(domain name or IP address). Different phases of the study
use different comparisons. Comparisons include how many
lists an indicator is unique to; list sizes; expanded list charac-
terization and intersection; pairwise intersections of all lists;
and following, a statistical test we define to determine if one
list adds elements shortly after another.
Results: Based on a synthesis of multiple methods, domain-
name-based indicators are unique to one list 96.16% to 97.37%
of the time. IP-address-based indicators are unique to one
list 82.46% to 95.24% of the time.
Discussion: There is little overlap between blacklists. Though
there are exceptions, the intersection between lists remains
low even after expanding each list to a larger neighborhood
of related indicators. Few lists consistently provide content
before other lists if there is intersection. These results sug-
gest that each blacklist describes a distinct sort of malicious
activity and that even merging all lists there is no global
ground truth to acquire. Practical insights include (1) net-
work defenders are advised to obtain and evaluate as many
lists as practical, (2) “whack-a-mole” is inevitable due to list
dynamics, barring a strategic change, an (3) academics com-
paring their results to one or a few blacklists to test accuracy
are advised to reconsider this validation technique.
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1. MOTIVATION
Blacklists, also known as block lists, threat intelligence
feeds, or threat data feeds, are lists of indicators used to deny
access to certain parts of the Internet by network defend-
ers. Most organizations connected to the Internet employ a
blacklist of some kind to detect and prevent unwanted com-
munications with adversaries. Between public lists, closed-
group information exchanges, and proprietary services, there
are hundreds of such blacklists available today.
A open challenge for security personnel is to create high-
fidelity intelligence from the data that is shared via black-
lists. The blacklists and their providers vary widely. Se-
curity personnel must evaluate and prioritize which lists to
implement and use. We take a step back from the black-
list evaluation cycle to examine the whole blacklist ecosys-
tem. Blacklist ecosystem analysis cannot evaluate individual
list effectiveness. However, quantifiable properties of the
ecosystem of blacklists, the interrelationships among lists,
and the features of all lists must inform any strategy for de-
riving high-fidelity intelligence.
Prior work on effective information sharing and collabo-
rative security has focused on areas such as the design of
the data sharing system [2, 15], creating repositories [14,
16], or social analysis of security personnel [24]. A strate-
gic analysis of the blacklist ecosystem is a study of how to
make sense of what is currently shared and what the entities
should share. Prior work has touched on blacklist effective-
ness and suggested that blacklists are incomplete [18]. Prior
blacklist overlap work has been limited to seven days and
nine lists [27], which we consider a tactical analysis rather
than a strategic one. A broader, strategic assessment of the
value of blacklist data is needed to contextualize and frame
the challenge of generating high-fidelity intelligence.
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There is little public information about how blacklist pro-
ducers create their lists. This secrecy is justified because
disclosure of the precise procedure of generating the lists
likely lets the adversaries avoid detection. However, this
secrecy does not benefit the operational analyst who must
decide which lists to apply on which network access con-
trol points and is often left making semi-educated guesses
about the providence and usefulness of a list in a particular
situation. We previously identified this interaction between
the (list) architect, user, and adversary as requiring further
study [22], and the blacklist ecosystem helps to inform that
broader effort.
From an operational point of view, the question is quite
practical. Network defenders need to know which lists they
should use to defend their networks. Evaluating individ-
ual lists is not generally possible because there is no global
ground truth about maliciousness. Ecosystem-wide views of
blacklist interaction are informative for the practitioner. If
no lists overlap and few mimic one another, then the strategy
would appear to be to acquire all lists, since they all contain
unique value.
Blacklist interrelation affects the information security eval-
uation and baseline creation as well. Academic and industry
papers often rate performance of a particular task according
to its agreement with some blacklist or lists. If all lists were
equal or generation methods open, this method would be ac-
ceptable. However, because each list is different and largely
non-overlapping, the ability to alter results by the choice of
list leaves the evaluation process open to manipulation, since
an author can choose the list that offers the best agreement.
Prior work suggests that blacklists of domains and IP ad-
dresses are untenable as sole defensive measures since the
cost of malicious infrastructure is driven down by economic
competition [20]. Blacklist ecosystem analysis sheds some
light on the accuracy of this model. We can find evidence
about this model in the blacklist ecosystem. The model pre-
dicts lots of malicious domains; it also predicts that no mat-
ter how much effort is spent on blacklisting, it will never
catch everything. These elements appear to hold true.
Blacklist ecosystem analysis is one aspect of a larger body
of work to quantify strategic cybersecurity issues. The black-
list ecosystem is intimately related to the low cost of do-
mains and infrastructure to adversaries [20], the poor state
of repair of consumer devices connected to the Internet that
permits abuse [7], the global nature of adversarial capability
for information technology [23], the challenges of modeling
the interaction between the user and the adversary [22], and
the challenges of designing effective and instructive obser-
vations in information security [8].
This paper unifies and expands on a series of white papers.
Detailed results and extensive tables that do not fit within
this paper are available in the white papers [10, 11].
2. METHOD
Basic results include reverse counts, list size measure-
ments, and pairwise intersections. Notable results reported
here include which lists appear to be following other lists.
Methods for these processes are described in this section.
List acquisition occurred in two phases. Phase one in-
cludes 25 blacklists and seven whitelists collected from Jan-
uary 1, 2012 through March 31, 2013. Phase two stops
whitelist collection but adds new blacklists up to a total of
85, and spans March 16, 2013 to June 30, 2014. Lists are se-
lected to cover a variety of target behaviors and geographic
areas (as purported by the list owners), such as botnet com-
mand and control, spam email senders, phishing senders,
identifiers within email message bodies, scanning, and ma-
licious download locations. List acquisition covers a con-
secutive date range of 30 months with some core methods
common to both phases. Phases one and two employ some
analyses that are run only on each phase, as the results of
phase one inform our research questions.
List acquisition has potential inconsistencies. For exam-
ple, our list acquisition was not constant. Lists were acquired
at certain time points, and each list could not be acquired at
exactly the same time. This asynchrony makes determining
who listed what first difficult; therefore, we worked in units
of days when determining “at the same time” and treated
anything on the same day as equivalent. In some cases, list
providers limited downloads to once per day; whereas oth-
ers encouraged two or three daily downloads. If an indicator
was listed only in between downloads, it would not be ob-
served. We judged that these inconsistencies are not relevant
to the granularity at which we are comparing the lists.
Comparison across such large time windows has certain
potential pitfalls, especially for IP addresses based on how
they are used on the Internet. Over time, IP addresses are
reassigned and reused due to features such as NAT, DHCP,
BGP, and IP address stewardship or assignment changes from
the regional Internet registries (RIRs).
We expect that these mechanisms have a real impact on
measurement over more than one year. All of these tech-
nical features have the effect of apparently and erroneously
increasing the intersection between lists. The increase in in-
tersection is because the same identifier is used by multiple
machines, and the lists may be detecting activity from a ma-
chine for each identifier it has. Alternatively, if an identi-
fier is shared by multiple machines, two lists may detect dis-
tinct behavior from distinct machines, but appear to intersect
because those machines share an identifier. These impacts
generally serve to make the reverse count analysis an upper
bound for how much intersection there is between lists. We
account for the effect of this overestimation analytically in
Section ??.
Core analyses run in both phases are reverse counts and
list counts (Sections 2.1 and 2.2). Since the results across
phases agree, the results from phase-one analysis are consid-
ered likely to hold during phase two, and phase-two analysis
is used to explore further questions.
Methods unique to phase one include characterizations of
the lists by identifier structure and Internet structure data
such as passive DNS and BGP. The function of these meth-
ods was to determine whether lists were detecting elements
in related neighborhoods or on related infrastructure while
not detecting rote identical elements.
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Methods unique to phase two include exhaustive pairwise
intersections and following analysis. Phase two also added
60 new lists to the analysis to expand the reach of the results.
2.1 Reverse Counts
The method used for counting how many indicators are
unique to one list, two lists, three lists, etc., is straightfor-
ward. Each comparable indicator (i.e., all the IP addresses)
is tagged with how many lists contained it. The number of
lists per indicator is counted; call it n. The reported result
is the number of indicators on n lists for n = 1 up to the
maximum n observed.
2.2 List Counts
List counts are the total number of unique indicators ob-
served on the list at any time during the observation period.
Each list is given an anonymized numeric identifier and la-
beled either LI for a list of IP addresses or LD for a list of
domain names. This naming convention is used wherever
lists must be referred to individually. Each list’s identifier is
the same throughout the report.
2.3 IP-Based Characterization
To characterize the IP address content of lists, we calcu-
late three functions related to the autonomous system num-
ber (ASN) responsible for each IP address and intersections
between blacklists and white lists. ASN assignment infor-
mation is derived from open source data [13, 12] using the
open-source SiLK toolsuite [3, 25].
“ASN Counts” results display the number of unique ASNs
represented by IPs on the blacklist and the total number of
IPs that all of those ASNs represent.
“Top 5 Countries by ASN” results take the ASN counts
one step further. Each ASN is associated with the country
in which the company that owns the ASN is registered. This
does not necessarily represent the geolocation of the IP ad-
dresses, but it does indicate which countries are in legal con-
trol of the host companies. “UNK” represents unknown.
For “ASN Intersections by Count” and “ASN Intersections
by Percentage” results, we intersect not by IP address but
over the set of ASNs associated with any IP address on each
blacklist during phase one. Therefore, if each list has at least
one IP address that is owned by the same ASN, that ASN is
counted as shared between the list. It does not mean the IP
addresses are necessarily the same. Otherwise, intersections
are calculated using standard set operations. The percentage
reported is the percentage of the smaller list.
2.4 Domain-Based Characterization
There are many different measurements by which to con-
textualize and cluster list contents during phase one that are
unique to domain-based lists. These approaches include la-
beling with results from Google’s Safe Browsing corpus,
clustering by TLD, passive DNS analysis to determine which
domains are active, and clustering by name server of active
domains.
The intersection of each list with Google’s Safe Brows-
ing corpus of malicious URLs [5] must be determined us-
ing methods unlike the other intersection methods. Google
does not make the clear-text URLs available. Rather, Google
provides the hashes of entries in a custom data structure
and a client for checking URLs against that hash database.
We stored all the hashes listed as malicious by Google Safe
Browsing from October 1, 2011 through April 30, 2013.
To determine if a domain was known by Google, we check
to see if the domain tests positive using the provided tool
referencing the stored hash lists. Due to the nature of the
Safe Browsing data format, we cannot accurately state how
many domains are on the Safe Browsing blacklist, thus Safe
Browsing results cannot be further compared to the other
lists.
The “Name Servers and Domains” results report the num-
ber of active domains per blacklist. To be active in the DNS,
a domain name must have a name server. We use passive
DNS data for phase one to determine the number and per-
centage of domains on the blacklist that had valid name server
(NS) records. We calculate the number of unique name servers
for all domains, the average number of name servers a given
domain uses, and the number of domains on the list usually
associated with any given name server.
The “Top 5 Name Servers” results extract one item from
the process for the name servers and domains: the five name
servers that served the largest number of domains on each
blacklist.
2.5 Expanded List Intersection
To extend the analysis, we attempted to find any latent
links between the lists. We did this by expanding the lists
to other identifiers that could be considered immediately re-
lated to those on the list. The analysis collected about each
expanded list was similar to that described in the core anal-
yses.
We use a commercial passive DNS source as the data for
the expansion and follow our indicator expansion method
[21]. Every phase-one list was expanded one step. For lists
that contained IPs, the IP addresses were expanded to do-
mains (“ID”); for lists that contained domains, the domains
were expanded to IP addresses (“DI”).
The reason for this expansion is to gather information about
whether lists are monitoring similar resources but reporting
more specific results. One IP address may commonly host
10,000 domains. In the rare case they are all malicious, one
list may contain half, and another list may contain the other
half, making it appear that the lists are disjoint. However,
after one “DI” expansion, each list would contain the same,
single IP, indicating that these lists are more related than ini-
tially believed.
The method we use is the most permissive so that we do
not miss any relationship. By permissive we mean the ex-
pansion is not filtered to remove false positives, as it would
normally be when pivoting for operational CND. Thus, the
intersections provided by this method are an overestimate.
We also compare the expanded “DI” lists to the phase-one
lists containing IP addresses. The result is some measure of
similarity between the domain-based lists and the IP-based
lists. The lists were compared in pairs of two, one list from
15
the original IP-based lists, and one list from the “DI” ex-
panded lists. The five pairs with the largest rote intersection
cardinality and largest intersection based on the percentage
of the smaller list are reported for these comparisons.
Phase-one lists that contain both domains and IPs are com-
pared to themselves. In this case, the domains from such lists
were extracted, a “DI” expansion was performed, and the IP
addresses derived from expansion were compared to the IP
addresses on the same list. The percentage of IPs derived
from the expansion that also appeared on the original list is
reported.
2.6 Time Series
This method examines the timing differences between when
different phase-one lists published certain identifiers. The
results contain five data elements, for a single pair of lists in
the relevant time frame. For each list pairing, we report
• rote intersection size
• percentage relative to each of the two lists
• list A and how many identifiers it published before list
B
• list B and how many identifiers it published before list
A
• how many identifiers were published on the same day
The values are calculated by finding the intersection between
the two lists for the relevant time period (2012 or 2013Q1)
and comparing the date that each list published each iden-
tifier that they share in common. Due to our collection in-
frastructure, the variable rate at which lists publish data and
analysis practicalities, the extent of our granularity for the
comparison was one calendar day. Each identifier was con-
sidered to be published on a date if the UTC time of publi-
cation to the list fell on that date.
2.7 Pairwise Intersection Counts
Each possible pairing of phase-two lists is generated and
the cardinality of the intersection between the two sets is









We define following to be if two blacklists contain similar
content during the same time period where one list consis-
tently lists elements earlier. Overlap could be due to similar
search strategies or outright copying. More formally, two
lists are not following if any intersection is essentially ran-
dom, with as many elements discovered first by list 1 as by
list 2. To test for following, we performed a one-sample t-
test on phase-two lists that had intersections of greater than
1000 elements. We test whether the average difference be-
tween shared element discovery times is 0, because this is
true if a list finds as many elements earlier as later. If we can
reject this null hypothesis of a 0 mean, we have reason to
believe that one list is following the other. We calculate this
determination on the granularity of one calendar day, not per
second, due to our coarse collection schedule.
The t-test is calculated as follows. For each shared ele-
ment between the lists, a time delta t∆ is calculated as t∆ =
t1−t2, where t1 and t2 are the times list 1 and list 2 published
the element, respectively. Over all shared elements, this dif-
ference creates a list of deltas t1∆ through t
n
∆, where n is the
number of shared elements; call this set T∆. The t-test is set
to test that the mean of T∆ is 0, so we set µ0 = 0. We cal-
culate x¯ as the mean of T∆ and s as the standard deviation of
T∆. The value of the t-test for each list pairing is calculated







The p-value is calculated by the standard single-value,
two-tailed t-test based on the degrees of freedom n−1. The
result is the probability p that the experimental results are
observed by chance even though the null hypothesis is true
if we repeated the same experiment. There is only one black-
list ecosystem, so we must test certainty this way rather than
repeating the measurement. We discuss what it means for
the null hypothesis to be false (x¯ 6= 0) in Section ??.
A summary goal is to report on the number of indicators
involved in a nonzero-mean relationship between two lists.
We are unaware of a precedent for what should be consid-
ered a reasonable p-value in such science of security work.
Initially, we tested a p-value of 0.01. At this value, we failed
to reject the null hypothesis for 2 of 21 domain-name-based
intersections and 54 of 859 IP-address-based intersections
(i.e., most results were significant).
However, after inspecting the results we fear this choice of
P risked a high type I error (α). When summarizing the re-
sults, we set a more aggressive p-value for certainty that the
mean was nonzero: 2.2× 10−16. Different fields of inquiry
tend to tune p-values from the de facto 0.01 to the practical-
ities of their field, for example particle physics customarily
uses a p-value on the order of 10−7 [17, p. 9]. We chose the
most aggressive threshold that R can report. However, since
we cannot re-run the test this year (there is only one blacklist
ecosystem), the results should be considered as exploratory
analysis rather than a formal hypothesis test.
We only considered pairwise intersections with more than
1,000 elements to ensure that the sample was robust and to
help control for anomalous small intersections. The indica-
tors from any pairwise intersection that pass this test have
some non-random relationship. Each pairwise intersection
provides indicators; we report on the total unique indicators
involved in any such potential following relationship by re-
porting the cardinality of the union of the set of indicators
involved in any pairwise intersection passing this test.
3. RESULTS
The results presented in this section are more concise than
the results from the 2013 report. This conciseness is partly
because the results are largely compatible with prior results
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and so do not need to be repeated. Furthermore, since the
number of lists analyzed increased to 85, we cannot report
as many detailed results and need to focus more on summa-
rizing the results in meaningful ways.
For example, we checked to see if any of the blacklisted
IP addresses were known sinkhole IP addresses. This infor-
mation would essentially invalidate the indicator as an indi-
cator of malicious activity, since sinkholes are operated by
network defenders who clean up and collect intelligence on
threats. Only one list out of 67, LI_3, contained any sinkhole
IP addresses and that list contained only 10.
All the reported results are meant to inform the extent of
uniqueness of black lists. The reverse counts indicate how
frequently indicators appeared on multiple lists. List counts
give a sense of the variety of lists involved. Phase one results
(Section 2.3 through Section 2.6) are merely highlighted; the
full 280 pages of results are available for further analysis
[10]. Pairwise intersections provide a more-detailed look
at how large the intersection is between each pair of lists,
demonstrating that a few lists overlap quite a lot. The analy-
sis of “following” attempts to quantify these pairwise inter-
actions to determine whether there is a reliable cause or pre-
dictable ordering of which list produces an indicator first, or
if the two lists just happen to be listing the same indicators
essentially randomly.
3.1 Reverse Counts
Since reverse counts are a core analysis, we present sets
of results for phases one and two.
3.1.1 Phase One (01/01/2012 to 31/03/2013)
Reverse counts for phase one are broken up into domains
and IP addresses and CY2012 and 2013Q1 (January 1 to
March 31, 2013).
Domain-based lists for phase one demonstrate little vari-
ability based on the duration of the time frame, results in Ta-
ble 1 and Table 2. The intersection during 2013Q1 is higher
by 1 percentage point. It is not clear if this result is a real
trend; the phase-two results for domains are directly between
these two results, so it is likely not a real upward trend.
Table 1: Reverse Counts – 2012 Domains








These two time frame lengths show somewhat different
behavior for IP addresses. Table 3 shows that 66% of IPs
were unique to one blacklist when the measurement period
was a year, but during the shorter period of Table 4 74%
were unique to one list.
Table 2: Reverse Counts – 2013Q1 Domains







Table 3: Reverse Counts – 2012 IPs














3.1.2 Phase Two (16/03/2013 to 30/06/2014)
For domain names, 30,784,571 total unique indicators were
observed during the 15-month observation period. There
were 29,602,108 indicators observed on exactly one list. There
were 1,182,463 domain names observed on multiple lists, or
3.84% of all observed domain-name indicators. Of the in-
dicators that appeared on multiple lists, 780,162 indicators
appeared on exactly two lists, or 66% of the indicators that
appeared more than once. Table 5 displays the complete
results for how often domain-name indicators appeared on
multiple lists.
For IP addresses, 121,921,509 total unique IP address in-
dicators were observed during the 15-month observation pe-
riod. There were 100,532,890 indicators observed on ex-
actly one list. There were 21,388,619 IP address indicators
observed on more than one list, or 17.54%, with almost half
of those (10,412,833) occurring on exactly two lists. Table 6
displays the complete results for how often IP-address indi-
cators appeared on multiple lists.
3.2 List Counts
The size of the lists surveyed varies widely. Since phase
one lists are a subset of the phase two lists, we report the
sizes of the lists only during phase two (due to space con-
straints). Some lists have over ten million indicators, some
have less than a thousand, and most are in between. The list
names are anonymized and given a random identifier; LD
indicates a list of domains, whereas LI indicates a list of IP
addresses. Results are based on the number of unique identi-
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Table 4: Reverse Counts – 2013Q1 IPs













Table 5: Reverse count of the number of times
each phase-two domain is on domain-based blacklists.
(30,784,571 total domains on 18 lists over 15 months.)














fiers observed over the 15-month observation period, regard-
less of how long the identifier was on the list. Table 7 pro-
vides the sizes of all lists of domain-name-based indicators.
Table 8 provides the sizes of all lists of IP-address-based in-
dicators.
3.3 IP-Based Characterization
Characterizing the IP addresses on the blacklists by ASN
demonstrates some overlap. The three lists with the most
ASN overlap have 96% of all their represented ASNs in
common. However, even at such a coarse granularity, the
commonality does not hold; many pairs of lists do not have
many ASNs in common. The largest ASN overlap between
15 IP-based is 19% of ASNs represented by the lists. This
result is larger than the number of rote IP addresses shared,
but active ASNs are far fewer and larger than individual IPs.
3.4 Domain-Based Characterization
Table 9 summarizes passive DNS activity for 2012. The
variability in percentage of list active is more likely a spuri-
Table 6: Reverse count of the number of times each
phase-two IP address is on IP-address-based blacklists,
max was 1 IP on 38 lists. (121,921,509 total IP addresses
on 67 lists over 15 months.)































ous effect of list collection. However, the relation of number
of name servers and domains reflects how reliant adversaries
are on centralized DNS infrastructure. Since few domains
use many name servers, it appears adversaries are not heav-
ily reliant on single-name servers. The highly common name
servers are mainly commercial servers for registries, which
serve enough domains that many happen to be malicious.
Google Safe Browsing had a low intersection rate with al-
most all lists including the ID expansion of the IP-address
based lists. There were two exceptions to this trend: two
domain-based lists had 41% and 22% of their domains, re-
spectively, known to Safe Browsing in 2013 and 35% and
29%, respectively, in 2012.
3.5 Expanded List Intersection
Some lists follow similar malicious resources differently;
however, it is rare. There is only one clear instance of a pair
of lists that do not overlap much rote but do overlap after
expansion. These are list_12 and list_03 in the white paper;
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see Table 127 [10]. The IP addresses of the two lists do
not overlap much in 2013, but after indicator expansion to
domains, there is over 99% overlap between the domains.
On the whole, when expanding the IP-address-based lists
to all domains hosted on the IPs in the list, they retain their
distinctness. The ID expansion of the 2012 lists still has
77% of domains unique to one of 11 lists, out of 211 million
domains, as displayed in Table 10.
3.6 Time Series
The relatively low base intersection rate makes measuring
which list is first less certain. There are some phase-one lists
that do appear to be consistently faster than those lists that
do intersect with them. Feed_04 is the singular example of
this. Otherwise, it’s not generally clear that one list is consis-
tently earlier or later than another just by taking the average
of the number of indicators that appear on one or the other
first. This uncertain result leads to our decision to determine
“following” more rigorously in phase-two analysis.
3.7 Pairwise Intersections
The results for the pairwise intersections of all lists is
quite long. The full results can be found in the appendix
of our 2014 white paper [11]. The lists are anonymized fol-
lowing the same pattern as described in Section 3.2.
3.8 Following
Our “following” test fails to reject the null hypothesis if
the temporal intersection features between lists appears de-
pendent on the lists’ interaction. This interaction may be
due to any variable that is influencing one list to consistently
contain an indicator before another; our test is agnostic of
the cause of the temporally linked interaction.
The total number of unique domain names in the set of
lists involved in following interactions is 809,394, or 68.45%
of the 1,182,463 indicators that appeared on multiple lists.
There were 17 pairwise intersections of domain-name-based
lists that contributed to this total, out of 21 total pairwise list
intersections with more than 1,000 elements.
The total number of unique IP addresses in a set that failed
the hypothesis test of a zero mean for the pairwise intersec-
tion is 5,803,501, or 27.13% of the 21,388,619 indicators
that appeared on multiple lists. There were 648 pairwise in-






































































tersections of IP-address-based lists that contributed to this
total, out of 859 total pairwise list intersections with more
than 1,000 elements.
4. DISCUSSION
There are many common blacklists that describe indica-
tors of malicious activity for the Internet. These lists gen-
erally do not intersect. Therefore, it appears that these lists
do not converge on one set of malicious indicators. There
are not obvious subsets of convergent lists either, such as
might be explained by communities of lists tracking similar
kinds of malicious behavior, such as phishing senders. For
comprehensive detection, it is better to consider all the lists
together than to rely on an intersection.
This result of relatively small intersection is consistent
with recent results about overlap among open-source cyber-
intel indicators [26]. It is also consistent with independent
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Table 9: Passive DNS activity of domains on blacklists,
2012. N per D is namer servers per domain, D per N is
domains per name server.
# Active % of List # of NS N per D D per N
2,398,180 86.7231 733,140 3.4176 11.1795
307,472 86.8342 207,608 4.4252 6.5539
265,080 64.5182 207,137 4.6222 5.9152
187,800 96.8426 130,131 3.6899 5.3251
200,320 93.9292 121,610 3.7458 6.1703
13,867 91.1104 17,182 4.5257 3.6525
2,345 7.6916 5,541 4.8162 2.0383
2,033 0.0181 4,431 4.4929 2.0614
447 12.1965 1,927 5.7584 1.3358
19 3.9583 71 5.0000 1.3380
Table 10: Reverse count of domains unique to one ex-
panded ID list source, (out of 211,852,820 total domains
and 11 lists, 2012).












results from larger studies by industry [1, p. 9] and aca-
demics [9]. Due to the long duration of our study, the con-
servative assumptions we make, and the independent corrob-
oration by three other sources, we are highly confident this
is a genuine characteristic of the global blacklist ecosystem.
It is important to accurately measure the extent of the ex-
isting overlap. Features of regular Internet operation com-
plicate this calculation. Although IP address movement and
reassignment can be accurately estimated for the Internet as
a whole, we cannot reliably estimate the probability that any
single IP address was reassigned. These mechanisms inflate
the amount of intersection by some factor. Such an effect
does not compromise our conclusions because the relevant
aspect of our conclusion is how little intersection there is
between the lists. The unknown intersection inflation factor
means our naive measurement is actually only an upper limit
on the intersection. Even making the conservative assump-
tion to ignore this reassignment inflation, the conclusion is
still strong. Nevertheless, we attempt to use the phase-two
analysis to estimate reassignment inflation and thus get a bet-
ter idea of the true operational intersection between lists.
The number of IP addresses unique to one list drops markedly
in phase two, despite adding lists. We believe the pressure on
adversaries to avoid black lists has driven them to use new
infrastructure faster during this time frame. During 2012
into 2013 is when the phenomena of crimeware-as-a-service
[19] and exploit-as-a-service [6] were first reported, so this
timing aligns with our observations.
Competition among list vendors contributes to genuine in-
tersection among lists. If an indicator is on two lists and one
list followed the other then the lists genuinely overlap on
that indicator. The following test indicates only that there is
some relationary factor we have not accounted for. Random
factors such as inflationary Internet features, like DHCP and
NAT, should not usually cause this “following” behavior. We
consider intersection due to “following” relationships as the
lower bound on the genuine intersection among lists because
it definitely excludes inflationary features.
The naive reverse counts do not account for any inflation-
ary Internet features. Our “following” test is likely too strict
and undercounts the duplicative results from lists because of
the low p-value used in the test and the artificial limit of test-
ing only intersections with at least 1,000 indicators. There-
fore, we believe the genuine result is somewhere in the range
created by the two methods.
An indicator provides unique CND value unless that in-
dicator duplicates information on another list, where dupli-
cation cannot simply be due to indicator churn or Internet
architecture changes. The range of unique value to CND
from an indicator on domain-name-based lists is narrower
than that for IP-address-based lists, but both ranges indicate
highly unique indicators. Phase-two domain-name-based in-
dicators do not provide unique value to CND between 2.63%
and 3.84% of the time. That is, between 96.16% and 97.37%
of domain-name-based indicators are uniquely provided by a
single source. Phase-two IP-address-based indicators do not
provide unique value to CND between 4.76% and 17.54%
of the time. This wider range for IP-address-based lists is
expected because there are fewer IP addresses than domain
names, and because IP addresses are more commonly reused.
As is evident from these two ranges, the large majority of the
time, any list’s indicator will provide unique information and
value to CND.
Thus far, we have discussed the facts of what we observe
about the blacklist ecosystem. The natural next question is
why is the ecosystem this way. Our current explanation is
that each list, or perhaps a pair of related lists, describes
and follows a specific type of malicious behavior with a
specific detection strategy from a particular sensor vantage
[4]. These three axes of variation provide a very large and
sparsely populated space for the blacklists in the ecosystem.
Like ecological niches, they are incentivized to spread out to
areas of little competition.
Further, one must hold two of these three aspects fixed to
perform an intelligible comparison between two lists. Oth-
erwise which aspect causes the variation is not deducible.
This is an internal validity challenge in experiment design
on engineered mechanisms [8]. In practice, it is not possible
to hold two of these three aspects fixed. Therefore, it is not
practical to rigorously compare one list to another list. Since
comparison and benchmarking is not practicable, there is no
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thorough or convenient way to evaluate the performance of
any of these lists. Any baseline is properly understood as
just another blacklist, with different detection strategy and
sensor vantage used to create the baseline. Each list is there-
fore currently best understood as a one-of-a-kind authority
on the particular type of activity it detects.
This problem is especially acute for academic researchers
attempting to prove their method is accurate by comparing
their results to known lists. Most lists do not intersect, so
what a researcher considers to be a “good” rate of intersec-
tion to prove a research method accurate may be meaning-
less. Further, it is important to consider which lists are used
as benchmarks, since so few common public lists intersect.
A further difficulty with this situation is that there is no
ready taxonomy or terminology for describing precisely what
activity a malicious actor is performing. Attempts to catego-
rize a list as following a particular malicious activity will
run into terminology and communication issues between re-
searchers. The best way to determine what malicious activ-
ity a list is following is to know what detection algorithm
the list uses; however, list detection algorithms are justifi-
ably almost never shared. This leaves both the academic and
operational cybersecurity community with few resources to
evaluate efficacy.
The CND lesson is that any one list, or any ten lists, cannot
provide a comprehensive description of all malicious indica-
tors. Every list the defender can obtain and use will probably
continue to provide new, non-overlapping defense to the net-
work. Though the defender must evaluate the quality of new
identifiers, any new list can provide useful identifiers of ma-
licious activity not already contained in the defender’s list.
This lesson implies that CND organizations should share in-
dicators as quickly as possible with as many trusted partners
as possible. Quick sharing will not eliminate the threat; how-
ever, it will drive the adversaries to use new infrastructure for
every attack rather than being able to reuse infrastructure to
attack multiple organizations.
A CND analyst or architect can also conclude that black-
lists are insufficient for adequate network defense. If block-
ing is so fragile, it is too easy to avoid. Other established
methods of CND should be prioritized and put into pro-
duction as appropriate, such as gray lists, behavioral anal-
ysis, web proxy content analysis, criminal penalties, speed
bumps, and organization-specific white lists. Such measures
will go much further to eliminate the threat, especially if
used in conjunction with quickly shared blacklists [20].
These blacklist results likewise challenge threat intelli-
gence analysts. Existing blacklists should be used to exam-
ine new threats with caution. Investigations certainly cannot
rely only on blacklists for the detection of ongoing activity.
Reputation and context of larger units of the Internet become
increasingly important to get a better idea of what behavior
is suspicious. For this task, processes such as intelligent in-
dicator expansion are useful [21].
5. FUTUREWORK
We hypothesize that the dynamics of blacklist ecosystems
generalize to any situation in which two conditions hold: de-
fenders are reacting to threats primarily by blocking previ-
ously identified indicators, and the attack vector is the result
of a digital economy (thus the marginal cost of the vector
asymptotes to zero). For example, we expect that similar
non-overlap occurs in anti-virus signatures, which are essen-
tially blacklists for files.
There have been some efforts to determine the complete-
ness of blacklists [9]. It is not clear whether the methods
used are simply comparisons to yet another blacklist, and
thus whether they are trustworthy. Intuitively, if so few lists
overlap, it is unlikely that the set of them is complete. How-
ever, more work in data analysis and statistics, such as ex-
tending the capture-recapture population estimation techniques,
needs to be completed before we can be sure about the com-
pleteness of the blacklist ecosystem.
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